The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the French law which prohibits the concealment of one's face in public places. The law is directed principally at prohibiting Muslim women covering their faces in public spaces in France. The
Introduction
On 11 October 2010, the French government passed a law to ban and criminalise the concealment of faces in public places (burqa ban law).
1 Section 1 of the law stated that 'No one may, in public places, wear clothing that is designed to conceal the face.' Section 3 provides that any breach of the prohibition of face concealment in public places is punishable by a fine of up to 150 euros. In addition, an order to follow a citizenship course designed to remind the offender of the 'Republican' values of equality and respect for human dignity may also be imposed by the courts as a supplement to, or in lieu of the payment of a fine. The burqa ban law has been the subject of considerable debate since then, not least because of its implications for the rights of Muslim women in the country. The next section provides a brief overview of the case followed by a critical examination of the implication of the basis of the Grand Chamber's decision. The analysis includes a consideration of how the decision potentially promotes forced assimilation policies against minorities in Europe and beyond. To illustrate its implications, I briefly highlight the experience of the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China. The third section examines the nature and implication of denialism which is a significant feature of the arguments of the French and Belgian governments as respondent and intervener in the case respectively. The article concludes that the decision in S.A.S v
France is retrogressive and should be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity by the Strasbourg Court.
The facts, Arguments and Decision: A Brief
The case was instituted by a female French national who was born in 1990 and lives in
France. She is a devout Muslim and wears the burqa and niqab in accordance with her religious faith, culture and personal convictions. She explained that the burqa is a full-body cover including a mesh over the face, whereas the niqab is a full-face veil leaving an opening only for the eyes. The applicant also emphasised that no one, whether her husband or any other member of her family had exerted any pressure on her to dress in this manner. Further, the applicant stated that she wore the niqab in public and in private, but not 'systematically'
and she might not wear it, for example, when she visited the doctor, when meeting friends in a public place, or when she wanted to socialise in public. Hence, she was mainly content with wearing the niqab when she wished depending on her specific spiritual inclinations at a particular time. At times she feels obliged to wear the niqab in public 'in order to express her religious, personal and cultural faith.' She did not aim to annoy anyone with her preferences in this manner but to 'feel at inner peace with herself.'
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The Applicant stated that she was disposed to taking off her niqab when required for security checks in places like banks or airports. Indeed, she had no issues with showing her face when requested to do so for necessary identity checks. 5 She complained that she is no longer able 4 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraphs 10-12 5 S.A.S v France note 2 supra at paragraphs 13-14. to wear the full-face veil in public since the law entered into force on 11 April 2011. She alleged that this amounts to a violation of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11, taken separately and together with Article 14 of the Convention.
The applicant contended that the interference constituted by the ban could not be said to have the legitimate aim of 'public safety' since it does not relate to specific safety concerns in places of high risk such as airports, but extends to virtually all public places. As to the Government's argument that it sought to 'ensure respect for the minimum requirements of life in society', the applicant stated that the ban failed to consider the culture of minorities which did not necessarily share that philosophy. The ban equally did not take into account the fact that there were other forms of communication apart from visual. There was also no justification for imposing criminal sanctions to prevent people from veiling their faces in public. Further, the argument that the ban was to ensure gender equality was criticised by the applicant as being chauvinistic and paternalistic based on stereotypes. 6 The French governments conceded that the ban constituted a 'limitation' within Article 9 (2) of the Convention on the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs but was justified because it pursued legitimate aims and that it was necessary, in a democratic society, for fulfilling those aims. First, it is intended to secure public safety; to ensure proper identification and prevent fraud. The second aim is the 'protection of the rights and freedoms of others' by ensuring 'respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society'. The face was central to and plays a central role in human interaction, reflecting 'one's shared humanity with the interlocutor'. Covering the face in public places breaks 'the social tie' manifesting a refusal of the principle of 'living together'; 'le vivre ensemble'. Further, the French government argued that the ban sought to protect equality between men and women as the concealment of women's faces in public because of their gender amounted to denying them the right to exist as individuals. The burqa it was argued, reserved the expression of women's individuality to the private family space or an exclusively female space. In addition, the ban aimed at upholding respect for human dignity as the women who wore face veils were 'effaced' from the public space which was 'dehumanising' and inconsistent with human dignity.
8
The salience of the issues raised by the case attracted the attention of Amnesty International, Liberty, Open Society Justice Initiative, ARTICLE 19 and the Human Rights Centre, University of Ghent all of which applied and were granted leave to submit written comments.
The Belgian Government was also given leave to take part in the hearing since the country had also taken a cue from the French and enacted a similar law on 1 June 2011.
In its ruling on 1 July 2014, the Strasbourg Court unanimously dismissed the technical objections raised by the French government that the applicant had failed to show she was a victim; that the case was actio popularis, and neglected to explore or exhaust local remedies before approaching the court. It also declared inadmissible, the Applicant's complaint under Article 3 (the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) taken separately and together with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) while finding by a majority (15-2) that there was no violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. To the consternation of observers, 9 the majority decision, affirmed 8 S.A.S.v France note 2 supra at paragraph 82.
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See for instance Saïla Ouald Chaib 'S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face Veil' Strasbourg Observers (3 July 2014) available at: http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-womenwearing-a-face-veil/ (accessed 7 July 2014); S Berry 'SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?' EJIL Talk (2 July 2014) available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-does-anythingremain-of-the-right-to-manifest-religion/ (accessed 7 July 2014); E Howard 'S.A.S v France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?' EJIL Talk (7 July 2014) available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-livingtogether-or-increased-social-division/ (accessed 7 July 2014). the propriety of the burqa ban law (and by implication, that of Belgium) on the basis of a notion of 'living together' advanced by the French (and also Belgian) government. The majority decision stated that under certain conditions the "respect for the minimum requirements of life in society" referred to by the Government -or of "living together", as stated in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill…. -can be linked to the legitimate aim of the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others".
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The New Jurisprudence of 'Living Together': Legalising Repression, Sanctioning
Assimilation?
As indicated above, the Strasbourg Court premised its decision on the principle of 'living together,' a new concept that is not covered by any provision of the Convention. The majority decision, partly dissented to on this holding by Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom, emphasised that respect for the conditions of 'living together' was a legitimate aim for the measure in issue. The majority found that the State had a wide margin of appreciation as regarding a general policy question on which there were significant differences of opinion as that in issue. On this basis, the ban was 'proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the conditions of "living together" as an element of the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others."' 11 This, despite the judges' finding that the ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs… they are thus confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise of their 7 freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect for their private life. It is also understandable that the women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their identity.
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In any event, as the dissenting joint opinion pointed out, the conception of 'living together' as accepted in the majority decision, casts the requirement to make oneself (in this case, the women who prefer to use the veil) available for contact and communication in public places as an obligation imposed against the individual's will. Surely, as the dissenting opinion further noted in this regard, there is recognition, under the right to private life not to communicate and to avoid contact with others in public places.
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More puzzling still, the decision stated the realisation by the judges that the burqa ban law risks 'contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the expression of intolerance' contrary to the State's obligation 'to promote tolerance.' 14 Surely, these admissions which are of course common knowledge and not at all remarkable, commend nothing short of a holding contrary to the court's finding in favour of the full-face veil ban law. which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within the society in question. 29 What is fairly clear from this is that the notion of living together involves the need for a minority to succumb to the preferences of a majority. This becomes clearer in the last part of the paragraph where the decision, in apparent reference to the specific facts of the case stated that The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.
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In other words, the 'right of others'; the majority, is to be imposed on the minority as a measure of social cohesion and mandatory engagement even where the minority do not request such engagement or deem it desirable. There is no solid legal or moral justification for imposing the will (real or imagined) of the majority in the context in focus on the minority. The finding of the Council of State of the Netherlands on the issue that 'the subjective feeling of insecurity [of the majority or a group] could not justify a blanket ban on the basis of social order or public order' 31 is to the point. To proceed to uphold the burqa ban risks the rights and freedoms of minorities. For instance, based on the notion of 'living together' it would be valid for the majority to determine at some point that some other innocuous aspects of a religion be banned.
Importantly, the judges conceded the slippery nature of the premise for its decision stating that 'in view of the flexibility of the notion of "living together" and the resulting risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of the impugned Also, the wearing of certain carnival costumes involve as much covering of the face as the burqa or niqab. In this regard, Section 2 of the burqa ban law states that the prohibition shall not apply if the clothing is prescribed or authorised by primary or secondary legislation, justified for health or occupational reasons, worn in the context of sports, festivities or artistic or traditional events. Why make exceptions for these activities rather than regard them as anathema to social interaction and 'living together'? So, anybody could cover their face for work purposes, carnivals and sports. The dissenting opinion notes that in these cases 'Nobody would claim that …the minimum requirements of life in society are not respected.'
35 So why should the religious purpose offend a conception of 'public order' and notion of 'living together'? This is especially relevant since neither the French nor the Belgian governments explained or cited any example of how the impact of wearing the burqa or veil is different from the approved practices of concealing the face.
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The lawmakers considered it appropriate to focus on prohibiting the identity preferences of less than 2,000 women who cover their faces 37 among a Muslim population of five million
and an overall population of 65 million. 38 It takes little persuasion with the knowledge of these facts to surmise that the premise of the ban is not the liberation of 'subjugated women' or ensuring human interaction. It is settled, in light of the exceptions recognised by the law that we can live together with the faces of some (in this case a negligible minority) covered.
Moreover, beyond conjecture about the possibility of 'living together' with full-face covers, such covering alongside conventional social interaction is a well-established part of European culture. margin of appreciation in a given case, it is obliged to consider what is at stake. This is important since, as the court also noted, the margin of appreciation must be considered along with 'European supervision' of the national law and the 'decisions applying it.' 50 This duty requires it to determine whether the measures taken at national level were justified in principle and proportionate to the aims pursued. On the facts in this case, the Strasbourg ought to have protected the rights of a negligible minority as what is in issue does not impact negatively on the majority. The court did not find any evidence that shows women who wear the full-face veil seek to express a form of contempt against or offend the dignity of others.
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It is thus difficult to see how the Court could have upheld the ban.
Related to the foregoing, the court also referred to a notion of 'choice of society' which it at least implicitly linked with the principle of democratic legitimacy.
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The 'choice of society' premise in as much it is tied to democracy and democratic legitimacy is suspect on the facts.
Advertence to democratic legitimacy as basis for according a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities cannot be absolute. As Letsas has argued, 'democratic legitimacy' or for that matter, 'state consent' is not the only value consideration to be made in determining valid legal obligations particularly those which implicate human rights. 53 Otherwise fascism or Nazism, based on the actual or ostensible will of the majority will be a valid policy even where they brazenly violate human rights, typically those of the vulnerable or minorities.
In any event, as the partly dissenting joint opinion highlighted, the Strasbourg Court ought to have beneficially drawn on its own precedents that promote pluralism on issues of freedom of expression even where such are deemed 'radical.' 54 In this regard, and with particular reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and their manifestation, the minority joint opinion finds further support in the first real case that was determined by the court on Article 9 of the Convention; Kokkinakis v. Greece.
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On the 'general principle' that underlies Article 9, the court sitting as a chamber stated that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention but also 'precious' to agnostics, sceptics ad atheists. Further,
[T]he pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of The government position is that 'Ethnic unity is the means by which the frontier can be civilised' and it has been promoting and enforcing the view that 'ethnic unity is prosperity, ethnic separation is disaster.'
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The Beijing government's policy envisages the 'fading away of ethnicity' and the 'fusion' of all the ethnic groups as key to the success of the country. 
68
The series of 'integration' measures which are in reality the imposition of the dominant Hans
Chinese socio-economic, political and cultural preferences 69 has generated various responses among the Uyghur in recent decades. Among others, they have led to the development of a feeling of 'cultural genocide'. 70 The net result of the policies has been the rejection of 'the Utopian visions of "nationality unity" (minzu tuanjie) and "nationality equality' (minzu pingdeng) perpetuated in state discourses.' 71 This has been expressed mainly through 67 Clarke note 63 supra at 544.
symbolic resistance and non-violent means. 72 The policies have also fuelled periodic social unrest and political violence in Xinjiang. 73 Consequently, the Uyghurs have come under extensive surveillance so much so that they have developed a strong sense of self-censorship as compared with the Hans Chinese. This has led to an increased sense of distrust and resentment towards the State and emergence of a separatist movement in the region. 74 With growing international awareness and concern about extensive repression of the Uyghurs, the Chinese government has described and handled the responses for political and cultural self-determination as terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. 77 72 Finley note 71 supra. 73 Clarke note 70 supra.
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There are two aspects of the denialism evident in the case made by the two governments.
First is that the full face concealment ban does not target Muslim women. The second is on the empirical evidence of three independent research conducted in Belgium, France and the Netherlands which showed that a burqa ban was counter-productive as it led to women concerned avoiding going out leading to their isolation, deterioration of their social lives and autonomy and even increased experiences of aggression against them.
The denial by both governments on the first point is overt and directed at dissipating the strong charge of discrimination the ban entails. The applicant had argued among others that France rejected the claim by asserting that the prohibition applied irrespective of religion and sex. 79 Belgium similarly maintained that the full-face veil ban 'applied to any person who wore items concealing the face in public, whether a man or a woman, and whether for a religious or any other reason'. 80 Yet, in virtually all other instances involving covering of the face by any reasonable number of people or group, the law recognised either explicit or implicit exemption from the general ban. Rather counterintuitively, both governments even inverted the argument that the burqa ban could lead to exclusion of those who desire to cover their faces from society and thereby enlarge the scope for their assumed 'dehumanised' The second point of denial as mentioned earlier is that the burqa ban does not harm Muslim women who prefer to wear it. It is interesting to observe in this regard how the French government sought to discredit three discrete empirical research projects that found that a burqa ban left women who wore it worse off as they are forced to choose between either to jettison their religious convictions or stay away from public places including schools and hospitals as well as increased attacks on them. The French government asserted that the research was only of a 'small sample' and suggested the method adopted 'was not very reliable,' provided only a 'partial view of reality' and that their 'scientific relevance had to be viewed with caution'. Nitpicking research findings is one of the typical approaches adopted by denialists.
83
It is interesting that the French government neglected to present any research findings, theoretical or empirical to evidence the 'reality' of its own claims. The findings in question, it must be borne in mind, emanated from research conducted after the bans in France and
Belgium. The two governments had the opportunity both before and after the ban to research into the basis of the ban which were publicly contested at all relevant times. Why should it not be inferred that these omissions were due to the fact that the French (and the Belgian) government was aware the 'reality' was different from their suppositions? It is a fact that the Xinjiang province was so renamed by the Chinese government only after it incorporated it; the word 'Xinjiang' which means 'new province' is reflective of this reality. The reported call for debate on the use of the veil is ominous coming from a Liberal
Democrat party member in light of the background fact that the 'explanatory memorandum' Court is pandering to dangerous political leanings currently growing in many parts of Europe.
The decision in S.A.S v France signals the Strasbourg Court is lending, even if unwittingly, institutional weight to anti-Muslim prejudice which has become rife in the Europe in the last one and half decade or so. And this can only be dangerous for our hopes for a truly liberal society.
Shami Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, a UK-based human rights group, in an interview she granted the London-based Guardian newspaper after the judgment, eloquently conveyed the view of many who have aired concern that the face veil ban is the product of a sinister agenda that is antithetical to all liberal values. The ban, she noted 'has nothing to do with gender equality and everything to do with rising racism in Western Europe.' As she queried, 'How 
